This paper evaluates potential explanations for the sometimes poor forecasting performance of the Phillips curve. One explanation is that outof-sample metrics are noisy or, equivalently, have relatively low power. Another potential explanation is instability in the coefficients of the model. To assess these forces, this paper compares sample forecasting results to results from bootstrap simulations of models that either assume stability or allow breaks in the coefficients of the model. This analysis indicates that a significant portion of the weakness of the out-of-sample evidence is attributable to power limitations. But instabilities in the coefficients on the output gap also play a role.
widely used and studied models in macroeconomics. In particular, variants of the Phillips curve continue to appear in efforts to model and understand business cycle fluctuations, forecast inflation, and analyze monetary policy (see Clark and McCracken (2003) for examples). That said, historically the Phillips curve has been subject to considerable debate, surveyed in such studies as Gordon (1990) , King and Watson (1994) , and Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) . In recent years, the Phillips curve in the form of a model relating inflation to the output gap has enjoyed something of a renaissance, in part because the supply side of the standard dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium model with sticky prices reduces to an expectational form of a Phillips curve (see, for example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and McCallum and Nelson (1999) ).
A common metric for evaluating Phillips curve models is their performance in out-of-sample forecasting. The models are, after all, often used for forecasting. In fact, some studies-examples include Kuttner (1994) and Gerlach and Smets (1999) -explicitly estimate or define the output gap as the component of output that has predictive power for inflation. Moreover, even if forecasting is not an explicit objective, out-of-sample forecast performance has come to be widely viewed as a useful metric for evaluating a model. 1 For example, since the work of Meese and Rogoff (1983) it has become standard in the empirical exchange rate literature to use forecast performance as a metric for evaluating models of the exchange rate; recent examples include Mark (1995) and Clarida et al. (2003) . A number of Phillips curve analyses have also explicitly treated forecast performance as a test of model validity. Examples include Fisher, Mahadeva, and Whitley (1997) , Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) , and Camba-Mendez and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2001) .
As is the case with so many relationships of interest in macroeconomics, there is now considerable evidence that, despite seemingly good in-sample fits, the outof-sample forecast performance of Phillips curve models is mixed. While the generalized Phillips curve literature is far too long to be tractably surveyed here, recent examples of studies documenting a good in-sample fit of reduced form inflationoutput gap specifications include Kuttner (1994) , Gerlach and Smets (1999) , Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) , and Orphanides (2003) . Of analyses that consider out-of-sample performance, some conclude that Phillips curve formulations generally forecast well; recent examples include Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997) , Stock and Watson (1999b) , and Fisher, Liu, and Zhou (2002) . Other studies reach the opposite conclusion. For example, Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) conclude that various Phillips curve models fail to out-forecast a random walk. Orphanides and van Norden (2005) show that estimates of the output gap made in real time often fail to improve forecasts from a simple autoregression.
In this paper we sift through potential explanations for the weakness of the outof-sample evidence on the Phillips curve relative to the in-sample evidence, focusing on models relating inflation to the output gap. One potential explanation-simply referred to as the power explanation-is that although the models are stable over time, out-of-sample metrics are less powerful than the usual in-sample Granger causality tests. Put another way, forecast comparisons could be sufficiently noisy in small samples that, even though the output gap enters the data-generating process (DGP) for inflation, there is a material probability that the output gap fails to improve inflation forecasts. Stressing the lower power of out-of-sample tests, Inoue and Kilian (2004) advocate the use of in-sample tests for model evaluation.
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A second potential explanation is model instability-shifts in the parameters of the inflation-output gap model. In general, Stock and Watson (1996 , 1999a , 2003 document pervasive instabilities in reduced-form macroeconomic relationships. More particularly, studies such as Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) have found evidence of changes in the behavior of monetary policy, which, as Roberts (2004) notes, could affect the slope of the Phillips curve. McCracken (2003, 2005b) provide analytical evidence on how shifts in coefficients can affect tests of equal forecast accuracy and encompassing. Instabilities that lower the power of outof-sample forecast tests relative to in-sample tests could account for the relative weakness of the out-of-sample evidence on the Phillips curve.
Admittedly, though, the existing evidence for the Phillips curve does not necessarily suggest much role for instability. Stock and Watson (1999b) report that although there is evidence of instability in the AR coefficients of an inflation-unemployment rate model, the apparent shifts do not affect forecast performance much, and the coefficients on unemployment appear stable.
3 Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) apply stability tests to the full set of coefficients of an inflation-output gap model and are unable to reject stability. Estrella and Fuhrer (2003) find little evidence of instability in joint tests of a Phillips curve relating inflation to the output gap and an IS model of output. Similarly, detailed test results reported in Stock and Watson (2003) show inflation-output gap models to be largely stable. However, imposing a break in the early 1980s, Roberts (2004) concludes the slope of the Phillips curve has fallen.
Our results show that much of the relatively weak out-of-sample performance of the Phillips curve can be attributed to simple power differences associated with stable models, although power differences created by instabilities in the coefficients on the output gap also play a role. We arrive at this conclusion by comparing sample results for a range of inflation and output gap measures to results of bootstrap simulations of estimated DGPs that either (i) assume stability or (ii) allow discrete breaks in the model parameters. The imposed shifts in the DGPs are based on the results of break test analysis applied to the empirical models in question. According to our results, many of the empirical failures of the output gap to improve inflation 2. The power explanation might be especially relevant to the extent that the relative power of outof-sample metrics declines as the forecast horizon increases, because in-sample evaluations of models relating inflation to the output gap routinely use quarterly inflation rates while forecast evaluations often include longer forecast horizons.
3. A growing literature is debating the persistence of inflation and whether persistence has declined, with part of the answer seeming to hinge on the treatment of shifts in mean inflation. For example, while Stock (2001) and Pivetta and Reis (2002) find persistence is and has remained high, Levin and Piger (2003) find that persistence is much lower once mean shifts identified by break tests are allowed.
forecasts are consistent with stable models in which the output gap truly affects inflation. The RMSE confidence intervals implied by such models are often large enough to cover observed failures of a Phillips curve model to forecast more accurately than an AR model for inflation. For those predictive breakdowns that are too large to be consistent with a stable model, including in the DGP a shift in the output gap coefficient identified by break tests yields RMSE confidence intervals large enough to cover the sample breakdowns of the Phillips curve.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the data, model specifications, forecasting scheme, and bootstrap methodology. Section 2 presents the sample forecasting results. Section 3 uses bootstrap simulations of stable models to examine the ability of simple power differences to account for the gap between the in-sample and out-of-sample evidence. Section 4 presents evidence on structural instabilities in the Phillips curve. Section 5 then examines whether those sample results not explained by stable models are consistent with DGPs with breaks.
1. METHODOLOGY
Data
As previous analyses have relied on a range of inflation measures and gap definitions, we present results for two measures of inflation and two measures of the output gap. Inflation is measured using the GDP (chain) price index and the CPI excluding food and energy, or core CPI. The GDP price index (or, equivalently, the deflator) and CPI seem to be the most commonly used measures in the recent generalized Phillips curve literature. We use the core CPI in lieu of the overall CPI because policymakers tend to focus on ex food and energy inflation and because using the core CPI mitigates the role of energy price shocks. As described below, we have also generated results for two alternative measures of core consumer prices, presented in appendix tables available from the authors' websites or upon request. One is the chain price index for consumption (the core PCE price index). The other is a core CPI index that, unlike our baseline (published) core CPI, treats housing consistently from 1967 through 2003. The published CPI's treatment of housing changed dramatically in 1983, from the cost of purchasing a home to the implicit rental value of the shelter. The housing-consistent CPI extends the usage of the rental value approach back to 1967. 4 Although most researchers use the published CPI, some, such as Gordon (1998) and Brayton, Roberts, and Williams (1999) , have used the housing-consistent series to avoid a potential break in the behavior of inflation.
4. To obtain a full 1957-2003 time series on this alternative CPI, we follow Gordon (1998) and Brayton, Roberts, and Williams (1999) and splice the published 1957-66 CPI based on housing purchase costs to the 1967-2003 CPI based on implicit rental costs. Such splicing does create the potential for a 1967 change in inflation behavior. However, the treatment of housing should have a much smaller effect on the CPI's behavior from 1957 to 1966 than it does from 1967 to 1982, due to the high and variable interest rates of the 1970s and early 1980s. That is, any 1967 change in the behavior of the spliced series should be much smaller than any 1983 change in the behavior of the published CPI. Note that we seasonally adjust the spliced monthly price index for 1957 through 2003 using the X-11 filter.
Note that the PCE price index treats housing consistently (measuring costs with the rental value approach) over its full history.
For the output gap, we use the measures most common in the recent Phillips curve literature: (1) actual GDP less the CBO's estimate of potential GDP (in logs) and (2) Hodrick and Prescott (1997)-filtered GDP. In an earlier version of this paper (Clark and McCracken 2003) , we also considered the output gap computed with a one-sided version of the HP filter. Stock and Watson (1999b, 2003) explicitly use the one-sided filter because it produces the gap that would be estimated in real time with a given data set. While our one-sided output gap estimate yielded results that are in many respects qualitatively similar to those we report, we found the one-sided measure has less predictive power for inflation (in-sample and outof-sample). Presumably, the lower and less consistent predictive power of the onesided gap reflects some added difficulty of forecasting in real time, highlighted by Orphanides and van Norden (2005) , among others.
All data except the CBO's estimate of potential GDP were obtained from the Federal Reserve Board's FAME database. The potential GDP series was downloaded from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis' website. The data span 1957:Q1 through 2003:Q3.
Models
Following Stock and Watson (1999b, 2003) , among many others, we treat inflation as being close enough to I(1) to warrant imposing a unit root and compare forecasts of the change in inflation from a Phillips curve specification including the output gap to forecasts from a simple autoregressive model. While not reported, models specified in inflation levels yield qualitatively similar forecast results. We report forecast results for the two horizons that seem to be most widely used in previous studies and most interesting to policymakers: one quarter and four quarters.
Letting τ denote the forecast horizon (in quarters), we use reduced-form Phillips curves
where inflation is π
t ≡ π t , and y t is the output gap in percentage terms (in logs multiplied by 100).
5 The same basic model specification has been used in studies such as Stock and Watson (1999b, 2003) . In our forecast evaluation, we focus on comparing projections from this model to those from a model without the output gap. This AR specification takes the form
5. As reflected in Equation (1), we include just one lag of the output gap in the Phillips curve to be consistent with most other studies of inflation and output gap relationships.
In results not reported in the interest of brevity, we also compare our Phillips curve forecasts against a random walk (no change) benchmark, as some inflation studies have used a random walk forecast as a benchmark (examples include Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) and Stock and Watson (1999b) ). We have omitted these sample results based on the random walk because they are qualitatively similar to those reported.
For simplicity, we use the same lag lengths on inflation (L) across forecast horizons and all time periods.
6 Particularly, we use the values that minimize the AIC in fullsample estimates of the Phillips curve (1) for τ ϭ 1. On that basis, models for the GDP price index include three lags, while models for the core CPI include four lags. We use the same lag orders in the AR models. We obtained qualitatively similar results when we instead used the SIC or applied the AIC to the AR equation for inflation to determine the number of inflation lags used in both of the forecasting Models (1) and (2). 
Forecast Evaluation
Reflecting the variety of forecast samples considered in prior studies, we evaluate out-of-sample forecasts over the long period 1977: Q1-2003:Q3 and several subperiods: 1977-89, 1990-2003; and 1977-84, 1985-93, 1994-2001 . Note that the first out-of-sample forecast at horizon τ is for the period ending in 1977:Q1 ϩ τ Ϫ 1.
In our reported results, out-of-sample forecasts from Models (1) and (2) are generated recursively.
8 After allowing for initial observations set aside for data differencing and lag determination, the first forecast is based on models estimated with data from 1958:Q3 ϩ τ Ϫ 1 through 1976:Q4. As forecasting moves forward through time, the parameters of the models are re-estimated with added (all available) data. From recursively estimated models, we obtain two sequences of forecast errors, û PC,tϩτ and û AR,tϩτ . Given our sample specifications, we have a total of 107 Ϫ τ ϩ 1 forecasts for horizon τ. For these forecasts, we construct the RMSEs
where P refers to the number of τ-step ahead forecasts under consideration for the sample period spanning observations R ϩ τ to R ϩ τ ϩ P Ϫ 1, and R corresponds to the last observation used in the regression estimates underlying the first forecast of the period under consideration.
To evaluate the simple power and instability explanations for the weakness of the out-of-sample evidence on the predictive content of the output gap, we could 6. As reported in the earlier analysis of Clark and McCracken (2003) , we also allowed the lag lengths to be chosen at each point in time as forecasting proceeds, and obtained qualitatively similar sample results.
7. Despite the greater parsimony of the SIC, Granger and Jeon (2004) and Marcellino, Stock, and Watson (2004) find that AIC-based model selection generally yields more accurate forecasts.
8. In earlier analysis (Clark and McCracken 2003) , a rolling forecast scheme-estimating the model parameters with a rolling window of observations-yielded qualitatively similar forecast results. use one of two approaches. The first, followed in our prior work on the general subject McCracken, 2003, 2005b) , would be to use Monte Carlo simulations of stable DGPs and DGPs with breaks to evaluate whether the powers of tests for equal MSE (and forecast encompassing) over various samples line up with the breakdowns in predictive content observed in the data. The second, simpler approach, used in this paper, is to rely on estimated p-values and confidence intervals for the ratio of the RMSE of the Phillips curve forecast to the RMSE of the AR forecast, RMSE PC /RMSE AR . Given a specification of the inflation model, we bootstrap p-values and confidence intervals for the RMSE ratio, using the bootstrap method described below. If some given breakdown in the predictive content of the output gap for inflation is consistent with a stable model, the confidence interval for the RMSE ratio bootstrapped from the stable DGP should include the sample value of the ratio. For those applications in which sample RMSE ratios lay outside the confidence intervals bootstrapped from a stable model, we bootstrap intervals from a DGP that allows shifts in the model coefficients identified by break test analysis, and examine whether the sample RMSE ratios lay within the resulting intervals.
Of course, the RMSE ratio-based approach we use is closely related to the approach of explicitly evaluating the power of forecast-based tests with Monte Carlo experiments. Basing inference on the RMSE ratio is equivalent to basing inference on the F-type test of equal MSE proposed by McCracken (2004) , because the F-type test is determined by the RMSE ratio. Specifically, letting MSE AR and MSE PC denote the squares of the RMSEs of the competing models, McCracken's test statistic MSEϪF ϭ P × (MSE AR Ϫ MSE PC )/MSE PC can be rewritten as MSEϪF ϭ P × (1/RMSE ratio 2 Ϫ 1). Accordingly, our RMSE comparisons are more powerful than the commonly used t-statistic for equal MSE developed by Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) : for forecasts from nested models, Clark and McCracken (2001 , 2005a , 2005b and McCracken (2004) have shown the F-type test of equal MSE to be more powerful than the t-test.
Note that, in light of our goal of accounting for differences between in-sample and out-of-sample evidence, we also provide results for a standard, full-sample test of Granger causality-the t-statistic on the output gap in Equation (1).
Bootstrap Method
To determine whether the sample RMSE ratios are consistent with the null of no predictive content of the output gap or an alternative in which the output gap does affect inflation, we use a simple parametric bootstrap. For the closely related F-type test of equal MSE, Clark and McCracken (2005a) show that, for multistep forecasts from models like (1) and (2), the test has a non-standard null asymptotic distribution that generally depends on unknown nuisance parameters. Clark and McCracken show that a simple bootstrap yields good size and power properties for a range of realistic DGPs, including an inflation-based model.
9 Accordingly, we 9. We have also conducted Monte Carlo experiments to verify that, even when the DGP includes shifts in the lagged inflation coefficients and residual variance (but the DGP has no output gap terms, as under the null), a bootstrap approach based on stable models still yields accurately sized tests for equal accuracy and forecast encompassing. In principle, though, because a model with such breaks is misspecified under the null on which the asymptotics are based, the breaks in the lagged inflation coefficients will affect the sizes of the predictability tests, as shown by Inoue and Kilian (2004) . Extending the existing asymptotic theory to models misspecified under the null is an important, difficult topic for future research.
use a bootstrap to estimate p-values and confidence intervals for our sample RMSE ratios.
Our bootstrap algorithm relies on the residuals of equations for the one-quarter change in inflation (∆π t ) and the output gap (y t ). To first determine whether the output gap significantly improves out-of-sample forecasts of inflation, we use an inflation equation that imposes the null that the output gap has no predictive power for inflation, taking the form of the restricted Model (2) with τ ϭ 1. To then determine whether any breakdowns in the predictive content of the output gap can be attributed to the simple power explanation or the instability explanation, we use an inflation equation including the output gap (Equation (1) with τ ϭ 1), with either stable coefficients or shifting coefficients. In all cases, the output gap equation takes the form of a simple AR model. In light of the potential bias in OLS estimates of regression parameters in time series models, we use the bootstrap method proposed by Kilian (1998a) to adjust the coefficients of OLS-estimated models and then use the bias-adjusted forms as the bootstrap DGP equations. That is, for a given DGP specification, we (1) estimate the equations by OLS, (2) adjust the coefficients for bias using Kilian's bootstrap method (with 10,000 draws), and (3) bootstrap the bias-adjusted model to generate artificial data for inference.
To allow for heteroskedasticity, all of our bootstrap implementations take the wild form suggested by Goncalves and Kilian (2004) . Stock and Watson (2002) , among others, have documented large changes in inflation and output volatility. For our baseline estimates of the Phillips curve, applying the Bai and Perron (1998) BIC approach to identifying multiple breaks turns up two breaks in the residual variance of (each measure of) inflation, reflecting the high inflation volatility of the early 1970s to early 1980s. To preserve such sample heteroskedasticity in our artificial data, we use a wild bootstrap. Let u t and v t denote the sample residuals from OLS estimates of the equations for inflation and the output gap to be used in the bootstrap. We draw a sequence of iid innovations ε t , t ϭ 1, ..., T, from the standard normal distribution, and use ε t u t and ε t v t as our artificial (bootstrap) innovations. From these bootstrap innovations and the bias-adjusted DGP equations, we construct artificial time series on inflation and the output gap.
10
For each of 10,000 bootstrap data sets, we use estimates of the forecasting Models (1) and (2) to form forecasts and the RMSE ratio (Phillips curve/AR). With the lag orders underlying the sample forecast results estimated and therefore uncertain, we use the approach suggested by Kilian (1998b) to ensure the lag uncertainty is appropriately reflected in our RMSE confidence intervals.
11 Specifically, for each artificial data set, we employ the same approach used in the sample data to determine the optimal number of inflation lags in the inflation forecasting models, and use the resulting model or lag order in forming the artificial forecasts.
In testing the null hypothesis of no predictive content of the output gap in our sample data, we follow the convention in evaluations of forecasts from nested 10. For simplicity, the initial observations are fixed at the sample observations. 11. Using fixed lags in the bootstrap yields very similar results. models and rely on one-sided inference. That is, we reject the null only if the RMSE ratio is far out in the left-side or negative tail of the bootstrap distribution under the null, and ignore the positive tail. We do so because, in our nested model environment, if the restrictions imposed on (2) are true, there is no reason to expect forecasts from that model to be more accurate than those from (1). Even if the RMSE ratio lay in the far right tail of the null distribution of the ratio, there would be no reason to reject the AR model in favor of the Phillips curve. As a result, the relevant alternative hypothesis is RMSE PC /RMSE AR Ͻ 1; the null is RMSE PC / RMSE AR ϭ 1.
However, in evaluating whether the sample breakdowns in the out-of-sample predictive content of the output gap are consistent with DGPs in which the output gap affects inflation for all or at least part of the sample, we rely on two-sided inference. Specifically, we report 90% confidence intervals. Two-sided inference is warranted by the nature of the exercise-determining whether the sample evidence is consistent with a particular alternative model, rather than with some null restrictions.
Finally, in the case of the in-sample t-test for Granger causality, we treat the test as one-sided, because the sensible alternative hypothesis is that the gap coefficient should be positive. Inoue and Kilian (2004) show that, in such cases, one-sided t-tests have potentially important power advantages over two-sided tests. However, in our applications, using a two-sided test would change the results very little.
SAMPLE FORECASTING RESULTS
Using the approach described above, we obtain sample results consistent with a broad reading of the literature cited in the introduction: on an in-sample basis, the output gap has highly significant explanatory power for inflation, but out-ofsample, the predictive power of the output gap is intermittent. As shown in Table 1 's full-sample estimates of Equation (1), the coefficient on the output gap is highly significant, for both measures of inflation and both measures of the output gap, at both the one-and four-quarter forecast horizons. Because the CBO-based gap measure is more volatile than the HP-filtered series, the gap coefficient is considerably larger for the HP-filtered series, while the R 2 's are little different. Despite having statistically strong in-sample explanatory power, on an out-ofsample basis the predictive content of the output gap is prone to breakdowns over some subsamples. While the Phillips curve/AR model RMSE ratios are less than 1 and the p-values are below 10% in many of the entries in Table 2 , it is also frequently the case that the RMSE ratios and p-values exceed 1% and 10%, respectively (a p-value of 10% or more indicates a failure to reject the null of no predictive content of the output gap). Such instances are denoted in Table 2 with a †. For example, the bottom half of the table shows that, for core CPI inflation and the CBO measure of the output gap, the gap has significant forecasting power until about the mid-1990s. With a forecast horizon of τ ϭ 1, the RMSE ratio is 0.962 One other result in Table 2 worth noting is that, even when the output gap has statistically significant out-of-sample explanatory power, the forecast gains are often quantitatively modest. For example, over the full forecast sample of 1977-2003, including the CBO output gap in the models for forecasting inflation in the GDP price index and core CPI yields a roughly 3% reduction in RMSE at the one-quarter horizon; at the four-quarter horizon, including the CBO output gap in the model lowers the RMSE about 9%.
EVALUATING THE SIMPLE POWER EXPLANATION
Especially in light of the evidence that the output gap only modestly improves the accuracy of inflation forecasts, the weakness of our out-of-sample evidence Notes: 1. The RMSE ratio is the ratio of the RMSE of the model including the output gap (Equation (1)) to the RMSE of the AR model (Equation (2)), which is reported in the column labeled AR RMSE. t refers to the forecast horizon. 2. The bootstrap procedure used to construct p-values is detailed in Section 1.4. Instances of breakdowns (at 10% confidence) in the out-of-sample predictive content of the output gap-that is, failures to reject the null of no predictive content at the 10% level-are denoted by †.
could simply be due to power limitations of the out-of-sample forecast comparisons. In general, out-of-sample tests tend to be less powerful than the usual in-sample Granger causality test, as shown by Inoue and Kilian (2004) . In this section we evaluate the extent to which, with stable models, power problems or limitations can account for the patterns in our sample results. In particular, we specify DGPs based on models fit to our full sample of data, and bootstrap confidence intervals for the sample RMSE ratios. The inflation equations in the DGPs (prior to the bias adjustment described in Section 1.4), which assume stability, are those given in Table 1 for τ ϭ 1.
In the case of the usual in-sample test for Granger causality, the results reported in Table 3 show that, in our bootstrap data, the test is virtually certain to correctly show that the output gap has predictive content for inflation. The power of the test (calculated by comparing the bootstrapped test t-statistics on the output gap (1) to those from (2)) to the confidence interval implied by a stable DGP in which the output gap affects inflation. The intervals are estimated by bootstrapping (bias-adjusted) estimates of Equation (1) for the forecast horizon τ ϭ 1 and a simple AR model for the output gap. For each artificial data set, forecasts of π (t) t ϩ t Ϫ π t are formed recursively using estimates of Equations (1) and (2). 2. As described in Section 1.4, the DGP equations are bias-adjusted, and a wild bootstrap is used to account for heteroskedasticity. The number of bootstrap replications is 10,000. Those sample RMSE ratios that fall outside the bootstrap confidence interval are denoted by †. 3. The figures presented in the 50th %ile column are medians of the bootstrapped distributions of the RMSE ratio. 4. GC power refers to the frequency with which the null of no causality of the output gap is rejected in the bootstrap data sets. The test takes the form of a comparison of the t-statistic on the output gap (based on Newey-West standard errors, with bandwidth of 0 for τ ϭ 1 and 8 for τ ϭ 4) against 10% (one-sided) critical values from the standard normal distribution. coefficient against a (10%, one-sided) standard normal critical value) is near one for all forecast horizons and inflation-output gap combinations.
The results in Table 3 also show that much of the weakness of our out-of-sample evidence can be attributed to the (stable-model) power limitations of out-ofsample forecast comparisons. The distributions of the RMSE ratios are wide enough that the 90% confidence bands for the ratios always include a value of 1. For example, for core CPI inflation and the CBO output gap, the 90% confidence band for the 1977-03 RMSE ratio is (0.888, 1.032) for one-step ahead forecasts, with a median of 0.970. The 90% bands are considerably wider for four-step ahead RMSEs, with somewhat more widening occurring in the left tail than the right. For the same DGP and sample period, the 90% confidence band for the four-step ahead RMSE ratio is (0.736, 1.083), with a median of 0.918.
In fact, the bootstrap confidence bands are wide enough that, in a number of cases, what nominally appears in the sample evidence to be a material breakdown in the predictive content of the output gap (Table 2) is consistent with a stable DGP in which the output gap truly affects inflation (Table 3 ). To take a "small" breakdown example, for the GDP price index-CBO output gap combination, the predictive content of the output gap appears to break down in one-step ahead forecasts for 1977-84 and 1977-89, reflected in (Table 2) is not inconsistent with a stable Phillips curve, for which the bootstrapped confidence interval reported in Table 3 is (0.852, 1.046). In the case of the GDP price index and HP output gap, the sample RMSE of 1.089 for four-step ahead forecasts in the 1985-93 period lay within the 90% confidence interval of (0.760, 1.098) associated with a stable Phillips curve. We should also note that, in results for other measures of consumer prices (the core PCE price index and housing-consistent core CPI) presented in appendix tables, essentially all of the apparent sample breakdowns in the predictive content of the output gap are consistent with a stable DGP in which the output gap truly affects inflation.
That said, for the GDP price index and published core CPI, some of the sample breakdowns in the predictive content of the output gap may not be consistent with a stable Phillips curve. These breakdowns are denoted in Table 3 with a †. For example, with core CPI inflation and the CBO output gap, for both forecast horizons the sample RMSE ratios for 1994-2003 lay well above the upper bound of the 90% confidence bands associated with a stable DGP: the RMSE ratios are 1.161 and 1.301 for τ ϭ 1 and τ ϭ 4, respectively, compared to upper confidence bounds of 1.035 and 1.106. Similarly, much of the breakdown in the HP output gap's predictive power for core CPI inflation (those for four-step ahead forecasts over 1985-93 and one-step ahead forecasts for 1994-03) does not appear consistent with a stable Phillips curve, based on the bootstrap confidence intervals.
To some readers, these limited instances in which the sample RMSEs fall outside the confidence bands implied by stable models may nonetheless be viewed as consistent with stable models. With sampling error, some failures (sample RMSEs outside the confidence intervals) will naturally occur. However, given the number of failures and the magnitudes (the size of the gap between the sample RMSE and the upper bound of the confidence interval) of some of them, model instabilities could also play a role. Therefore, in the next section we turn to a secondary explanation: discrete breaks in the parameters of the Phillips curve.
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Our empirical work builds on the McCracken (2003, 2005b) theoretical analyses of whether model instabilities can lead to out-of-sample breakdowns in predictive content.
EVIDENCE OF STRUCTURAL BREAKS
As noted in the introduction, any number of forces might create structural breaks in reduced form Phillips curves. As described in Section 1.1, one such force is measurement: the 1983 change in the treatment of housing in the published CPI could be the source of a change in the dynamics of our core CPI inflation series. Another potentially important force is monetary policy. Shifts in the behavior of policy could alter the coefficients on lagged inflation or the output gap in a reduced form Phillips curve. All that said, there is little clear evidence on any of these possibilities (except that the change in the treatment of housing certainly occurred). Although studies such as Sims and Zha (2004) have found policy to be stable over time, others such as Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Boivin (2004) have presented evidence of a significant change in the late 1970s or early 1980s. Even if changes in policy behavior have occurred, they may or may not affect the Phillips curve. Roberts (2004) finds that an imposed change in policy in 1983 reduces the slope of the Phillips curve. Yet Rudebusch (2005) shows that changes in the behavior of policy have little effect on reduced form Phillips curves. Moreover, the break test analyses in such studies as Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) , Estrella and Fuhrer (2003) , and Stock and Watson (2003) yield little evidence of instability in inflation-output gap models.
With at least some potential for instabilities, in the results reported in this section we test for breaks in the coefficients of the models under consideration using the Andrews (1993) extremum Wald test (the exponential Wald yields essentially the same results). Given the strong evidence of shifts in the volatility of inflation evident in Stock and Watson (2002) and our own data (described in Section 1.4), we follow Stock and Watson and use heteroskedasticity-robust variances in forming the Wald statistics. Break tests are computed for the output gap coefficient and the set of lagged inflation coefficients in each equation. In all cases, for simplicity we apply the breaks tests to just the models for one-step ahead forecasting. We compare the test statistics for a single break against the Andrews asymptotic distribution (reporting p-values computed with the Hansen (1997) asymptotic approximation) and a bootstrapped distribution. The bootstrap takes the basic form described 12. We limit our attention to discrete breaks rather than stochastic time variation (TVP) for various reasons. For one, auxiliary Monte Carlo analysis provided little evidence that TVP could yield predictive breakdowns like those in our sample. For another, allowing TVP failed to yield more accurate sample forecasts of inflation, in line with the evidence in Stock and Watson (1996) . Nonetheless, as Elliott and Muller (2003) argue, it is difficult to draw meaningful distinctions between discrete and stochastic breaks. (1) with τ ϭ 1 (regression estimates supposing stability are given in Table 1 ), as well as the supWald date. Tests are applied separately to the intercept, the set of coefficients on lagged inflation, and the coefficient on the output gap. In testing the stability of a given parameter or set of coefficients, the other coefficients in the model are assumed stable. Asymptotic p-values-labeled with asy in the in Section 1.4 (except that the inflation lag order is fixed). In light of the evidence of size distortions in break tests based on the Andrews asymptotics in Diebold and Chen (1996) and Hansen (2000), we put more weight on the bootstrap-based results.
13
Overall, our break test analysis yields only modest evidence of instabilities in the coefficients of the Phillips curve. As shown in Table 4 , for the models of inflation in the GDP price index, none of the break tests are significant when compared against the bootstrap distribution; none of the reported p-values are 0.10 or less. For the models of inflation in the core CPI, there is weak evidence of a break in the coefficients on lagged inflation and solid statistical evidence of a shift in the output gap coefficient. The bootstrap p-values for a break in the lagged inflation terms are 0.10 for the CBO output gap and 0.11 for the HP output gap (the asymptotic p-values are 0.01 for both output measures), occurring in 1980. As such, for core CPI inflation, there could be a break in the coefficients on lagged inflation, but the evidence is not quite significant. In the interest of simplicity, we proceed to assume no break has occurred in the lagged inflation coefficients, although as we discuss in more detail below, our findings are robust to allowing a shift. In results for the core PCE price index and housing-consistent core CPI, the evidence of a shift in the lagged inflation coefficients is stronger-the bootstrap p-values of a shift in 1983 are all 0.05 or lower (unpublished Appendix Table 6 ). Here again, though, whether a shift in AR coefficients is allowed does not affect our findings on whether a stable model or a model with a break in the output gap coefficient can better account for our sample forecast results. As we noted in Section 3, for these consumer price inflation measures, stable models can explain the predictive breakdowns observed in the sample (Appendix Table 5 ); so can models with a break in the coefficients on lagged inflation (Appendix Table 8 ).
13. Break test p-values generated with the Hansen (2000) heteroskedastic bootstrap procedure are comparable to those we report, based on a simple wild bootstrap. 1958:3-1982:4 and 1983:1-2003 :3, respectively. As described in Section 4, the postbreak coefficients for the core CPI models are restricted, rather than OLS-estimated, values. Results for the GDP price index are not included because the break tests provide no evidence of a significant shift. 2. The reported standard errors are robust with respect to heteroskedasticity.
As to the output gap term in the core CPI Phillips curves, there appears to be a statistically significant shift in its coefficient. The bootstrap p-value for a break in the output gap coefficient is 0.09 for the CBO measure and 0.01 for the HP measure; in both cases, the least squares date estimate is 1983:1. Unreported least squares estimates show the coefficient falling from large positive values over 1958:3-83:1 (0.245 for CBO and 0.429 for HP) to small, insignificant values over 1983:2-2003:3 (0.044 for CBO and 0.096 for HP). The large drops in the gap coefficient implied by the least squares estimates seem to imply breakdowns in the forecasting content of the output gap even more complete than those seen in the data. In fact, unreported bootstrap confidence intervals from DGPs with such a large break in the output gap coefficient fail to encompass some of our sample results.
In light of such evidence, and the imprecision of the postbreak coefficient estimates, we consider a break in the output gap coefficients of the core CPI models modestly smaller than those reflected in the least squares estimates. In particular, we impose a break magnitude that lowers the postbreak output gap coefficients to the levels obtained for stable Phillips curve estimates based on the core PCE price index and housing-consistent core CPI. According to our break test analysis for these measures (unpublished Appendix Tables 6 and 7) , the output gap coefficients in the core PCE and housing-consistent core CPI Phillips curves are generally stable, and virtually identical across the two inflation measures: about 0.10 for the CBO output gap and 0.17 for the HP gap. The timing of the break identified for our (published) core CPI series and the absence of a similar break in the core PCE and housing-consistent core CPI Phillips curves suggest the identified break to be due to the January 1983 shift in the treatment of housing in the published CPI (a shift made especially important by the volatility of the economy and interest rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s). As a result, we impose a break date of 1982:4, such that the postbreak coefficient applies to inflation data starting in 1983:1. As shown in Table 5 's resulting restricted estimates of the core CPI models, the coefficient on the CBO output gap falls from 0. 252 over 1958:3-1982: 4 to the imposed 0.10 over 1983:1-2003:3. The coefficient on the HP output gap falls from 0.450 to the imposed 0.17 over the same periods.
Based on these results, in the next section we proceed to evaluate the ability of models with a break in the output gap coefficient to generate some of the predictive failures observed in the data. In particular, we consider DGPs for core CPI inflation with a shift in the CBO and HP output gap coefficients in 1982:4. Of course, to the extent these shifts can account for the observed breakdowns in the forecasting value of the output gap, our explanation need not be viewed as the only possible one. As is well known, break testing and dating sometimes suffer from power and precision limitations. So there could be more breaks than we suppose, or a single break with different timing. Roberts (2004) , for example, argues that a break in the slope of a Phillips curve fit to core PCE inflation occurred in 1983, due to a change in the behavior of monetary policy. Although we cannot definitively rule out such possibilities, our basic approach is to be parsimonious in determining the presence of breaks. As an example, in the presented results, we treat the coefficients on lagged inflation in the core CPI model as stable, although the break evidence could be seen as suggesting a break. As noted above, though, in the case of the AR coefficients we have verified that whether or not a break in the AR coefficients is allowed has no real effect on our results. 14 Similarly, in the absence of significant evidence of a break in the relationship between GDP price inflation and the HP output gap, in our presented results we do not pursue a breaks-based explanation for the sample results. Rather, for this particular application, we generally attribute the handful of breakdowns in the predictive content of the HP output gap identified in Table 2 to the power limitations described above. To be sure, for this application, Table 3 indicates there are some inconsistencies between the sample RMSE results and the stable model confidence intervals. But, as noted above, some such discrepancies are to be expected, in light of sampling error. Although the unpublished appendix tables show that essentially all of the discrepancies for this application could be explained by an OLS-estimated 1976 shift in the coefficient on the output gap, there are no firm grounds for such a break. According to the formal tests, the 1976 shift is not statistically significant. Moreover, a shift in 1976 in just one of the inflation-output gap combinations considered is conceptually difficult to explain.
EVALUATING THE STRUCTURAL BREAKS EXPLANATION
To evaluate the "breaks explanation" for the sample forecast results from the core CPI-CBO gap and core CPI-HP gap applications, we specify DGPs based on models 14. This empirical finding is consistent with the theoretical analysis of Clark and McCracken (2003) , based on a local breaks asymptotic framework, according to which breaks in the coefficients of variables included in both the restricted and unrestricted forecasting models will have no effect on the power of forecast comparisons. (1) to those from (2)) to the confidence interval implied by a Phillips curve with a shift in the coefficient on the output gap. The intervals are estimated by bootstrapping (bias-adjusted versions of) the empirical estimates of the Phillips curves for the forecast horizon τ ϭ 1 reported in Table 5 and a simple AR model for the output gap. For each artificial data set, forecasts of π (t) t ϩ t Ϫ π t are formed recursively using estimates of Equations (1) and (2). 2. As described in Section 1.4, the DGP equations are bias-adjusted, and a wild bootstrap is used to account for heteroskedasticity. The number of bootstrap replications is 10,000. Those sample RMSE ratios that fall outside the bootstrap confidence interval are denoted by †. 3. The figures presented in the 50th %ile column are medians of the bootstrapped distributions of the RMSE ratio. 4. GC power refers to the frequency with which the null of no causality of the output gap is rejected in the bootstrap data sets. The test takes the form of a comparison of the t-statistic on the output gap (based on Newey-West standard errors, with bandwidth of 0 for τ ϭ 1 and 8 for τ ϭ 4) against 10% (one-sided) critical values from the standard normal distribution.
fit to our full sample of data, allowing the breaks in the output gap coefficients described above, and bootstrap confidence intervals for our sample RMSE ratios. The inflation equations in the DGPs (prior to the bias adjustment described in Section 1.4) are given in Table 5 .
Though not necessarily definitive explanations, the breaks we have identified appear to account for the sample breakdowns in the predictive content of the output gap that are not consistent with a stable model. As shown in Table 6 , all of the sample RMSE ratios lay within the 90% confidence intervals bootstrapped from DGPs allowing a break in the output gap coefficient. For instance, with the CBO output gap, the simulated confidence band for four-step ahead forecasts over 1994-03 is (0.560, 1.754), which encompasses the sample ratio of 1.301. By contrast, the stable DGP-based interval (Table 3 ) was (0.475, 1.106). Similarly, with the HP output gap, the simulated confidence band for four-step ahead core CPI forecasts over 1985-93 is (0.754, 1.385) (compared to Table 3's stable DGP-based interval of (0.726, 1.116)), which encompasses the sample ratio of 1.259.
Although these results suggest that instability in the output gap coefficient can importantly affect inferences from forecast comparisons, such instability seems to have little effect on the usual in-sample test for Granger causality. As shown in Table 6 , even in data bootstrapped from models with a break in the output gap coefficient, the test continues to reject the null of no causality with a probability near 100%. Such contrast in the outcomes of the in-sample and out-of-sample metrics is consistent with the analytical results of McCracken (2003, 2005b) .
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have sought to explain how the seemingly good in-sample fits of Phillips curve models fail to translate into consistently good out-of-sample forecast performance. We focus on models relating inflation to the output gap because this particular formulation seems to have garnered the greatest interest in recent years, in part because of the development of dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium models that yield a Phillips curve formulation relating inflation to expected future inflation and the output gap.
After presenting our own sample forecast evidence for a range of inflation and output gap measures, we use bootstrap methods to examine the extent to which the in-sample and out-of-sample evidence can be explained by the potentially lower power of out-of-sample metrics in stable models or instabilities in the model. In particular, we compare our sample estimates to confidence intervals obtained from bootstrap simulations of empirically based DGPs that (i) assume stability or (ii) allow discrete breaks in the model parameters. The imposed shifts in the DGPs are based on the results of break test analysis applied to the empirical models in question (as well as knowledge of an important change in CPI measurement methodology).
Our simulation results show simple power differences associated with stable models to be the primary source of the relatively weak out-of-sample performance of the Phillips curve, with power differences created by instabilities in the coefficients on the output gap contributing, but less so. The RMSE confidence intervals implied by stable Phillips curves are often large enough to cover the observed failures of the model to forecast more accurately than an AR model for inflation. For those predictive breakdowns that are inconsistent with a stable model, including in the DGP a shift in the output gap coefficient identified by break tests yields RMSE confidence intervals large enough to cover the sample breakdowns of the Phillips curve.
Consequently, our results suggest a Phillips curve in the form of a reduced form relationship between inflation and the output gap indeed exists, such that, over very long samples, the output gap should consistently improve inflation forecasts. But in the finite samples often considered by researchers and policymakers, the limited power of forecast comparisons or, equivalently, the noise in such comparisons, may result in the output gap failing to improve inflation forecasts. 
